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Whenever more than one person owns the right to market gas from
a well, the potential for disproportionate gas sales exists.' Although
often characterized as a "gas balancing" problem, the term "gas balanc-
ing" refers to the menu of equitable techniques for dealing with dispro-
portionate gas sales.2 This Article focuses on the basic issue of whether
one working interest owner3 can ever lawfully market more than their
* Copyright © 1990 by David E. Pierce
** Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law
1. For example, assume A and B each own 50% of the working interest in a gas well located in
Section 30. Their respective interests may be the product of voluntary pooling, forced pooling, leas-
ing undivided mineral interests, or assignment. Regardless of how their ownership interests wer-
created, each party has elected to separately market their proportionate share of gas produced fron.
the well. Something happens and A is unable to market its gas. Perhaps A's contract has termi-
nated; perhaps A has a dispute with its gas purchaser;, perhaps A, or A's purchaser, is unable to
obtain pipeline capacity to ship A's gas to the purchaser's delivery point, or possibly A thinks that
the current market price for gas is too low. This raises the issue of the relative rights of A and B
when A fails to market its 50% share of the gas being produced. Presumably B will continue mar-
keting gas from the well; indeed, B in most cases will be contractually obligated to third parties (their
lessor and gas purchasers) to do so.
The question arises as to whether B can lawfully market gas from the well. If so, it then be-
comes necessary to determine the rights and obligations of the affected parties and how these rights
and obligations should be administered. These are the questions that the law of disproportionate gas
sales seeks to answer.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 142-151 (discussing different approaches to gas
balancing).
3. For purposes of this Article, the term "working interest owner" includes any person who
1
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proportionate share of the gas stream. Depending upon how this basic
issue is resolved, the parties may or may not need to address gas balanc-
ing issues.4 Resolution of this issue can also impact the relative rights of
the lessor and lessee under various clauses of the oil and gas lease, such
as the habendum clause and the royalty clause. Other non-working in-
terest owners, such as owners of nonparticipating royalty and overriding
royalty interests, will also be affected by the administration of dispropor-
tionate gas sales.
This Article explores the conceptual basis for evaluating dispropor-
tionate gas sale problems under commonly encountered legal relation-
ships. These problems are examined in the context of:
1. Working interest owners who are common law cotenants.
2. Working interest owners developing the property pursuant to an
operating agreement.5
3. Working interest owners developing the property pursuant to a
pooling order.6
4. Working interest owners marketing gas under title 52, sections
has a right to enter and develop the property for oil and gas. This would include an unleased min-
eral interest owner.
4. If the disproportionate sale was unlawful, the party selling more than their share of the gas
stream will be subject to tort and, depending upon the agreements between the parties, contract
liability. If the disproportionate sale was lawful, the court will have the opportunity to consider
equitable techniques for protecting the interests of each party, such as some form of gas balancing.
5. See 2 D. PIERCE, KANSAS OIL AND GAS HANDBOOK § 17.17 (1989). As used in this arti-
cle, "operating agreement" refers to the contract entered into by the working interest owners to
coordinate development of the property. The operating agreement designates an "operator" and
specifies each working interest owner's rights and obligations throughout the development and pro-
duction process. Anytime there is multiple ownership of the working interest, or the potential for
multiple ownership, the working interest owners will normally enter into an operating agreement,
often called a "joint operating agreement" or simply "JOA." Id.
6. See Martin, The Gas Balancing Agreement: What, When, Why and How, 36 Rocky Mtn.
Min. L. Inst. 13-1 (1990) (pre-print edition) [hereinafter Martin]. Professor Patrick H. Martin sug-
gests that one way to avoid the disproportionate sales issue is to have the state oil and gas conserva-
tion commission specifically address the issue in their pooling orders. The pooling order would
authorize disproportionate sales and provide for equitable techniques to ultimately bring the parties
into balance. Professor Martin explained the pooling order approach, stating:
[W]hen you apply for a pooling order, you request a gas balancing paragraph as part of the
order. The paragraph would spell out the manner in which balancing would take place.
Such an order could allow and require the operator to market all production from the unit
unless the parties have entered into a gas balancing agreement. Once the order is entered,
the operator will be able to market the production without a non-marketer coming back
and revoking the authorization. The non-operator cannot complain if he had an opportu-
nity to assume responsibility for marketing his own share of gas. Since it is an order of the
agency, the operator is likely to gain some immunity from liability, and disputes arising
from the order would probably come under the jurisdiction of the agency. The agency
could periodically review the actions of the parties under the order and order cash balanc-
ing should it be appropriate. Likewise, the agency could provide a mechanism for payment
of royalty should that be necessary to protect the correlative rights of any party.
Id. at 49-50.
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 26 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss2/1
DISPROPORTIONATE GAS SALES
541-547 of the Oklahoma Statutes.7
The goal of this Article is to offer attorneys and judges a logical approach
to evaluating disproportionate sale problems.8
II. IDENTIFYING COTENANT AND COTENANT-LIKE RELATIONSHIPS
The first task in evaluating a disproportionate sales problem is to
identify the precise nature of the relationships that exist between the
working interest owners.9 This requires an examination of all convey-
ances and contracts affecting the working interest owners. Conveyances
affecting the parties should be examined to determine whether a common
law cotenancy relationship exists. Often some, but not all, of the parties
will have a cotenant relationship. For example, the well may be located
on a pooled unit consisting of all of Section 30. A and B each own an
undivided 50% interest in all the minerals in the North Half of Section
30. C owns all the minerals in the South Half. A and B are cotenants of
the minerals in the North Half, but they are not cotenants as to C, nor as
to any interest they may have under a pooling order or agreement cover-
ing the South Half.1"
After evaluating conveyances between the parties, contracts between
the parties must be evaluated. The parties may have entered into pooling
agreements, unitization agreements, operating agreements, gas balancing
agreements, processing agreements, division orders, and gas sales agree-
ments which can impact their relationships and their ability to meet their
relational obligations to one another. If all the working interest owners
have specifically agreed how disproportionate sales will be handled, their
7. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 541-547 (Supp. 1990). This statute is more commonly known by its
legislative designation: "House Bill 1221." It is also unaffectionately known as the "Sweetheart Gas
Act," which became law effective May 3, 1983. 1983 Okla. Sess. Laws 236. See generally Seal v.
Corporation Comm'n, 725 P.2d 278 (Okla. 1986), appeal dismissed sub nor., Amerada Hess Corp.
v. Corporation Comn'n, 479 U.S. 1073 (1987).
8. The "logic" of the analysis should never lose sight of the realities of gas marketing and the
practical needs of the gas industry.
9. Courts may decide not to attach any significance to the relationship, but this should be an
issue which is identified and addressed by the court. For example, if the court finds that the common
law cotenant relationship has been modified or displaced by a subsequent agreement between the
parties, the court should note this and articulate how the contract affects the relationship.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 16-25.
1990]
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agreement should govern their relative rights." This is most often ac-
complished through a "gas balancing agreement." 12 However, tradition-
ally, gas balancing agreements have been the exception instead of the
rule. Instead, working interest owners rely upon the operating agree-
ment as the basic document that will govern their rights in production.
Most gas production occurs under some version of the A.A.P.L.
Model Form Operating Agreement, 13 without the benefit of a gas balanc-
ing agreement. This may change with the development of a "model"
form of gas balancing agreement acceptable to the industry.14 However,
for the immediate future it appears that most disproportionate sales dis-
putes will be addressed without the benefit of a gas balancing agreement.
11. However, agreements entered into among the working interest owners cannot affect the
rights of persons who are not parties to the agreements. Persons who would not be subject to agree-
ments among the working interest owners would include nonparticipating royalty owners, royalty
owners, and other owners of rights to production carved out of the oil and gas lease prior to the
agreements. The rights of these parties will be determined by the agreements they signed or ac-
cepted: the oil and gas lease, the royalty deed, or an assignment.
12. 2 D. PIERCE, KANSAS OIL AND GAS HANDBOOK § 17.26 (1989).
When working interest owners enter into an operating agreement they often prepare a gas
balancing agreement to address the rights and obligations of each party when they make
disproportionate gas sales. Typically the agreement will permit the producing party to
take and market the full gas stream for their own account until the non-taking party is
able, or decides, to commence or resume taking gas. A record of imbalances is maintained.
Generally, the non-taking party will be entitled to makeup the imbalance by taking their
proportionate share of gas, plus a share of the other party's gas (usually not to exceed 50%
of the other party's share of the gas stream) until the gas account is balanced. If the
reservoir is depleted before balancing in kind is accomplished, the parties will account to
one another through 'cash balancing.'
Id
13. There are now four versions of the "Model Form Operating Agreement." Development
agreements entered into prior to 1978 will usually employ the "Ross-Martin" Form 610 "Model
Form Operating Agreement-1956" [hereinafter 56 Form]. D velopment agreements entered into
from 1978 through 1982 will probably use the "A.A.P.L. Form 610 - 1977 Model Form Operating
Agreement" [hereinafter 77 Form]. Development agreements entered into after 1982 will probably
use the "A.A.P.L. Form 610 - 1982 Model Form Operating Agreement" [hereinafter 82 Form].
Development agreements entered into from and after 1990 will probably use the "A.A.P.L. Form
610 - 1989 Model Form Operating Agreement" [hereinafter 89 Form].
The time periods are only rough approximations. Often a developer will not change to a new
form of agreement for many years, and will elect instead to use an earlier version with the alterations
and additions they have developed through experience with the form. In addition to the Model
Forms, there is also the occasional custom-made operating agreement. These are often encountered
when the well is being operated by a promoter with passive working interest investors. Offshore
operations are often conducted under company-generated operating agreement forms.
14. The efforts of David L. Motloch, and the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation com-
mittee which he chairs, have resulted in a model form gas balancing agreement for use, as "Exhibit
E," with the joint operating agreement. See Motloch, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation
Form 6 Balancing Agreement, 2 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. 10-1 (paper ten (10) of the Institute
on the Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreement, discussing the committee's model form gas balanc-
ing agreement).
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Therefore, the dispute must be resolved by evaluating less targeted docu-
ments such as the operating agreement and pooling agreement. All of
these agreements must be examined to discover whether they contain any
express guidance regarding disproportionate sales; usually they do not.
Even though these less targeted agreements fail to address the issue di-
rectly, they may disclose cotenant or cotenant-like relationships which
can be helpful, and perhaps determinative, in evaluating disproportionate
sales issues.
A. Common Law Cotenancy
The most pertinent common law analogy which courts are likely to
employ in evaluating disproportionate gas sales problems is cotenancy.
Although the analogy may often be far from perfect, 15 it offers the court
a logical starting point for its analysis. Therefore, once it is determined
how the properties have been assembled, the next step is to identify
whether an actual cotenancy exists between any of the parties. For ex-
ample, assume A owns all the minerals in the South Half of Section 30. B
and C each own an undivided 50% of the minerals in the North Half of
Section 30. A leases to X, B leases to Y, and C leases to Z. Y and Z are
"common law cotenants"16 of the working interest in the North Half of
Section 30. X is not a common law cotenant of any party. However, X
may, under certain circumstances, become a "contractual cotenant" 17 or
a "statutory cotenant" '18. If we assume conservation regulations limit
Section 30 to one gas well, the interests of X, Y, and Z must be combined
in some fashion for development. Depending upon the terms of any vol-
untary pooling agreement and joint operating agreement, and the state
15. See Martin, supra note 6 at 13-14. Professor Martin argues that in most situations balanc-
ing disputes can be resolved as a matter of contract interpretation (the operating agreement) or
statutory construction (pooling statutes and orders), without resorting to strained cotenancy analo-
gies. Id.
16. The phrase "common law cotenant" is used to distinguish a cotenancy created by concur-
rent ownership of an estate in land from cotenant-like relationships created by contract or statute.
However, rights under a common law cotenancy can be altered by contract or statute; making it
indistinguishable, for practical purposes, from a contractual or statutory cotenancy.
17. The phrase "contractual cotenant" refers to any cotenant-like relationship created by a
contract. The most common form of contractual cotenant is created by an operating agreement
between working interest owners.
18. The phrase "statutory cotenant" refers to any cotenant-like relationship created by statute
or administrative action. For example, a pooling statute may create the cotenant-like relationship.
See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 516 So.2d 376 (La. Ct. App. 1987), writ denied, 520 So.2d 118
(La. 1988), appeal after remand, 566 So.2d 138 (La. Ct. App. 1990). In Oklahoma, a statute imposes
a cotenant-like relationship on all gas producers. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 542D (Supp. 1990).
1990]
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where Section 30 is located, a cotenancy-like relationship among X, and
Y and Z, may be created.
If the parties have a common law cotenancy relationship, in a ma-
jority ofjurisdictions any cotenant can develop the property and produce
the oil and gas without the consent of the other cotenants. 19 The key
element of a common law cotenancy is the "unity of possession," i.e., the
right of each cotenant to occupy the entire undivided interest in the prop-
erty. Each cotenant has a right to immediate, but non-exclusive, posses-
sion of the property.20 Therefore, if X conveys to W an undivided
interest in X's lease covering the South Half of Section 30, X and W will
each have the non-exclusive right to develop the South Half. As to the
leasehold rights in the South Half, X and W become common law
cotenants.
21
The only limitation on a cotenant's right to extract minerals is the
obligation to ultimately "account" to non-producing cotenants for their
share of net profits.22 When dealing with extraction of a mineral from an
estate held in cotenancy, the extracted mineral is owned solely by the min-
ing cotenant. Removal and sale of minerals by the producing cotenant
does not constitute conversion or actionable waste.23 In addition to the
19. See, e.g., Cox v. Davidson, 397 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1965). See generally 2 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, § 502, at 573 (1989). The most notable exception to the majority rule
is Louisiana. Id. at 576-76.3. See also infra text accompanying notes 68-71.
20. See, eg., Fry v. Dewees, 151 Kan. 488, 493, 99 P.2d 844, 847 (1940). See generally J.
CRIBBET & C. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 111 (1989).
21. See, eg., Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, 95, 27 P.2d 855, 858
(1933).
22. Eg., Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924). The court, applying
Oklahoma law, held that the non-producing cotenant is entitled to an accounting from the produc-
ing cotenant for her proportionate share of "the market value of the oil produced less the reasonable
and necessary expense of developing, extracting and marketing the same." Id. at 574.
Another obligation of the cotenant would be to permit other cotenants to exercise their concur-
rent right to develop the minerals. Each cotenant extracting minerals would then have an obligation
to account for any net profits to all other cotenants. See, eg., Compton v. People's Gas Co., 75 Kan.
572, 89 P. 1039 (1907).
23. Kuntz, Gas Balancing Rights and Remedies in the Absence of a Balancing Agreement, 35
Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 13-1, 13-14 to 13-15 (1989) [hereinafter Kuntz]. Professor Kuntz, tracing
common law cotenancy rights from the Statute of Westminster II in 1285 through the Statute of
Anne in 1705, and their modem counterparts, concludes:
[I]n the absence of statute or agreement, or a repudiation of the cotenancy, there simply is
no basis for allowing one cotenant in real property to recover damages from another coten-
ant for conversion of natural gas that is produced from land and reduced to personal
property.
Id.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma adopted a similar approach in rejecting a conversion claim in
Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 782 P.2d 1367, 1371-72 (Okla. 1989). However, it is doubtful
the parties in Anderson were actually common law cotenants. See infra text accompanying notes 26-
32.
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right to an accounting, common law cotenants also enjoy another basic
cotenancy right: the right to end the cotenancy through partition. 4
Therefore, the common law arsenal of cotenant remedies includes an ac-
counting for net profits and the ability to end the cotenancy by
partition.2"
The reported cases have failed to clearly distinguish between the
common law cotenancy and cotenant-like relationships created by con-
tract or statute.26 For example, in Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp. ,27
the court considered whether Dyco, and Dyco's gas purchasers, were lia-
ble for the conversion of gas belonging to other working interest owners
in the well. The complaining working interest owners were not market-
ing gas from the well and Dyco was selling more than its 47% share of
the well's production. Dyco's gas purchasers refused to buy gas from the
complaining working interest owners .2  The Anderson court did not in-
dicate whether any of the parties are lessees or assignees of undivided
mineral or leasehold interests, nor did they reveal the existence of any
operating agreement, pooling agreement, pooling order, or statute that
would create a cotenant-like relationship. Without disclosing the source
of the relationship, the court concluded:
Under Oklahoma law Appellants [Anderson] and the other working
interest owners in the well [including Dyco] are tenants in common.
As cotenants each is entitled to market production from the well and
the sale of gas to a purchaser by one or more cotenants without con-
sent of other cotenants is lawful. Under ordinary circumstances it does
not involve tortious conduct, i.e. conversion, on the part of either the
purchaser or on the part of the working interest seller because each
24. See, eg., Mulsow v. Gerber Energy Corp., 237 Kan. 58, 697 P.2d 1269 (1985); Moseley v.
Hearrell, 141 Tex. 280, 171 S.W.2d 337 (1943). This is the basic common law cotenancy right that
will often be modified by contract, statute, or administrative order. See Martin, supra note 6, at 5-6,
8.
25. For an interesting case addressing a request for an accounting and partition, see White v.
Smyth, 147 Tex. 272, 214 S.W.2d 967 (1948). White is discussed in Kuntz, supra note 23, at 13-9 to
13-10.
26. Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 782 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989) (court does not attempt to
identify the source of the cotenant relationship); Teel v. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, 767 P.2d
391 (Okla. 1985), as corrected, (1986), reh'g granted and opinion amended, (1987), reh'g denied,
(1989) (court finds that the parties are common law cotenants but fails to apply common law coten-
ancy concepts to the dispute); United Petroleum Exploration v. Premier Resources, 511 F. Supp.
127 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (suggesting the parties were not common law cotenants and that their respec-
tive rights were governed by a pooling statute and their operating agreement); Beren v. Harper Oil
Company, 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App.), as corrected on limited grant of cert., reh'g denied, (1975)
(suggesting that the parties were not common law cotenants; instead, their respective rights were
governed by their operating agreement and industry trade usages).
27. 782 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989).
28. Id at 1369.
1990]
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cotenant has the right to develop the property and market production
under the common law.29
The court cited De Mik v. Cargill,3° Moody v. Wagner,31 and Mullins v.
Ward,32 to support its conclusions. Each of these cases concerned the
rights of common law cotenants.
In the recently mandated case of Teel v. Public Service Co. of
Oklahoma,3 3 the court acknowledged that the parties were common law
cotenants. Teel had entered into farmout agreements with Siegfried,
Siegfried, Inc., and Collins (the "operators"). The operators complied
with the terms of the farmout agreements and Teel assigned them undi-
vided interests in the farmout properties. Some of the wells were subject
to an operating agreement, while others were not.34 The operators then
entered into a gas sales contract with Transok. Upon pay-out, under the
farmout agreement, Teel apparently exercised an option to convert his
non-operating interest into an undivided working interest in the farmout
properties, thereby becoming a cotenant in the working interest with the
operators. Teel refused to sell his share of the gas to Transok and later
revoked the operators' authority to market his gas to Transok. Transok
was aware of Teel's actions but continued, at the operators' request, to
credit Teel's account with a proportionate share of the gas proceeds from
the operators' gas sales.35
Teel brought suit contending Transok and Public Service Company
of Oklahoma ("PSO")36 had converted Teel's gas. The alleged act of
conversion occurred when Transok purported to buy Teel's portion of
the gas stream with notice that Teel had revoked the operators' authority
to market gas to Transok. Since Transok purchased the entire gas
stream tendered by the operators who were the other cotenants in the
well, it is difficult to understand how Transok could be held liable for
conversion. Teel's claim was more properly against his cotenant opera-
tors for an accounting. Transok may have credited a share of the pro-
duction to Teel on their books, but this could have been corrected once
the rights of Teel and the other cotenants were determined.
29. Id. at 1371-72.
30. 485 P.2d 229, 231 (Okla. 1971).
31. 167 Okla. 99, 106, 23 P.2d 633, 639 (1933).
32. 712 P.2d 55, 62-63 (Okla. 1985).
33. 767 P.2d 391 (Okla. 1985), as corrected, (1986), reh'g granted and opinion amended, (1987),
reh'g denied, (1989).
34. Id at 394.
35. Id.
36. Id(Transok had assigned its contract to PSO).
[Vol. 26:135
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Transok converted Teel's
gas by purchasing it after receiving notice that Teel had revoked the op-
erators' right to market gas to Transok. 7 However, Teel could not re-
voke the right of the other cotenants to market the full gas stream. Teel's
indication to the operators that he wanted his gas to stay in the ground
should not alter the ability of the other cotenants to pass title to the
entire gas stream to Transok. Nor should Transok's accounting entries
affect Teel's rights against the producing cotenants. The court appar-
ently confused Teel's situation with one where, for example, Teel tells the
operators to deliver Teel's share of the gas to purchaser X, and the opera-
tors instead deliver it to Transok, which takes the gas knowing that the
operators had been instructed to deliver it to purchaser X. In the situa-
tion before the court, Teel effectively said to his cotenants, "you take all
of the gas now, I'll take mine when I can get a better price."
Although the court recognized that Teel and the operators were
common law cotenants, it failed to apply basic cotenant concepts to
Teel's claim. Most of what the court said about cotenants failed to sup-
port its conclusion. For example, the court stated:
The owners of undivided interest[s] in oil and gas rights are tenants in
common. Each of the cotenants may develop the common property
but not to the exclusion of the other cotenants. When gas is discovered
by one cotenant, the cotenant may deduct the necessary expenses of
developing, extracting, and marketing; but an accounting must be
made to the other cotenants for the pro rata share of the production.
A tenant in common may lease his/her interest in production without
the consent of other cotenants, but in the absence of an express agree-
ment, one cotenant is not an agent of the other. A gas sales contract
executed by a cotenant is limited to his/her interest.38
The court relied on the concept that the operators lacked authority to sell
Teel's gas. If one accepts this premise, then Transok could not have
purchased any gas belonging to Teel; all the gas Transok purchased be-
longed to the operators. Should one inquire as to where Teel's gas is, the
answer is that it is in the ground, awaiting marketing by Teel. Certain
erroneous findings by the trial court apparently derailed the Supreme
Court's analysis. The Teel court discussed the trial court's findings that:
"[T]he purchasers took delivery of Teel's gas which was produced by the
37. Id at 393, 397.
38. Id at 396.
1990]
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operators", and "[T]he operator had bought and sold Teel's gas to Tran-
sok and PSO. '3 9
The court relied upon these findings to support its holding that:
in the presence of notice that the non-contracting cotenant has revoked
the operator's right to sell, failure of a purchaser to account to each
working interest owner for his/her pro rata share of the proceeds sub-jects the purchasers to the same liability as the operator and the pur-
chaser may become a converter of the property.
If Transok was subject to the "same liability as the operator", then it had
no liability, since the operator had authority to deliver the entire gas
stream to Transok. The operator had an obligation to account to Teel,
but that did not affect title to the production purchased by Transok. Teel
successfully turned a simple accounting claim against his cotenants into a
conversion claim against Transok. The dissent in Teel suggested that the
proper resolution of Teel's claim would: "[P]ermit Teel to recover by
way of 'balancing' . ... ,41 However, a rare unanimous Oklahoma
Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp.,42 limited Teel to
situations where "a purchaser purports to buy gas of an owner from an
operator which is not authorized to deliver it."' g3
It appears that after Anderson 44, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
chosen to deal with all disproportionate sales issues as though the parties
were common law cotenants. However, the Oklahoma courts will have
to supplement their common law cotenancy approach by considering the
impact of any agreements between the parties, as well as applicable stat-
utes, regulations, and Corporation Commission orders.
B. The Contractual Cotenancy
Contracts between working interest owners may alter their common
law cotenant rights. If the parties are not cotenants, contracts between
them may create cotenant-like rights and obligations. Although pooling
agreements may create cotenant-like relationships, the contract that will
most often impact or create the relationship is the operating agreement.
39. Id. at 397.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 399 (Summers, J. dissenting) (quoting Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla.
Ct. App.), as corrected on limited grant of cert., rehg granted, (1975)).
42. 782 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989).
43. d at 1372. This was not actually the situation in Teel, because the operators were author-
ized, by the law of cotenancy, to deliver the gas; they just couldn't force a current sale of Teel's
proportionate share of the gas.
44. 782 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989).
[Vol. 26:135
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Each of the four form operating agreements, i.e., the 56 Form, 77
Form, 82 Form, and the 89 Form,4" provide for a contractual cotenancy
with regard to production from a defined "unit" or "contract" area. 6
The contractual cotenancy is created by the "ownership clause" of the
operating agreement. The ownership clause of each form agreement
provides:
56 FORM
4. Exhibit '" lists all of the parties, and their respective percentage or
fractional interests under this agreement. Unless changed by other pro-
visions, all costs and liabilities incurred in operations under this con-
tract shall be borne and paid, and all equipment and material acquired
in operations on the Unit Area shall be owned, by the parties as their
interests are given in Exhibit "A". All production of oil and gas from
the Unit Area, subject to the payment of lessor's royalties, shall also be
owned by the parties in the same manner....47
77 FORM
Exhibit "A" lists all of the parties and their respective percentage or
fractional interests under this agreement. Unless changed by other pro-
visions, all costs and liabilities incurred in operations under this agree-
ment shall be borne and paid, and all equipment and material acquired
in operations on the Contract Area shall be owned by the parties as
their interests are shown in Exhibit "A". Allproduction of oil and gas
from the Contract Area, subject to payment of lessor's royalties which
will be borne by the Joint Account, shall also be owned by the parties in
the same manner during the term hereof provided, however, this shall




Unless changed by other provisions, all costs and liabilities incurred in
45. See description of each form supra note 13.
46. The reference to "unit area" in the 56 Form, and the references to "contract area" in the
77, 82, and 89 Forms, all are essentially defined to include:
[A]ll of the lands, Oil and Gas Leases and/or Oil and Gas Interests intended to be devel-
oped and operated for Oil and Gas purposes under this agreement. Such lands, Oil and
Gas Leases and Oil and Gas Interests are described in Exhibit 'A'.
This language is quoted from Article I., Section C. of the 89 Form, which is substantially similar to
the 56, 77, and 82 Form definitions.
47. 56 Form, supra note 13, § 4, at 2-3 (emphasis supplied).
48. 77 Form, supra note 13, Art. III, § B, at 2 (emphasis supplied).
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operations under this agreement shall be borne and paid, and all equip-
ment and materials acquired in operations on the Contract Area shall
be owned, by the parties as their interests are set forth in Exhibit "A".
In the same manner, the parties shall also own all production of oil and
gas from the Contract Area subject to the payment of royalties to the
extent of - which shall be borne as hereinafter set forth.. ..
Nothing contained in this Article IILB. shall be deemed an assignment
or cross-assignment of interests covered hereby.49
89 FORM
Unless changed by other provisions, all costs and liabilities incurred in
operations under this agreement shall be borne and paid, and all equip-
ment and materials acquired in operations on the Contract Area shall
be owned, by the parties as their interests are set forth in Exhibit "A".
In the same manner, the parties shall also own all production of Oil and
Gas from the Contract Area subject however, to the payment of royal-
ties and other burdens on production as described hereafter....
Nothing contained in this Article IILB. shall be deemed an assignment
or cross-assignment of interests covered hereby, and in the event two or
more parties contribute to this agreement jointly owned Leases, the par-
ties' undivided interests in said Leaseholds shall be deemed separate
leasehold interests for the purposes of this agreement.5"
Each of these forms contemplates an Exhibit "A" which describes
the properties contributed by each party and lists each party's percentage
interest in the unit or contract area. For example, assume the contract
area is Section 30 consisting of 640 acres. Using our previous hypotheti-
cal, assume X owned the leasehold rights to the South Half of Section 30
and assigned an undivided one-half interest in its lease to W. Recall that
Y and Z each have a lease from cotenant mineral interest owners who
each owned an undivided one-half interest in the North Half of Section
30. Therefore, X and W are common law cotenants and Y and Z are
common law cotenants. X and W are not common law cotenants to Y
and Z. However, the ownership clause of the various operating agree-
ments creates a contractual cotenancy between each party having an in-
terest in Section 30. The Exhibit "A" would indicate that W, X, Y, and
Z are each entitled to a 25% ownership interest in the unit or contract
area.
Under all the operating agreement forms each party in this example
owns 25% of all production from the unit area. As the court in Reserve
49. 82 Form, supra note 13, Art. HI, § B, at 2 (emphasis supplied).
50. 89 Form, supra note 13, Art. III, § B, at 2 (emphasis supplied).
[Vol. 26:135
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 26 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss2/1
DISPROPORTIONATE GAS SALES
Oil, Inc. v. Dixon5 noted: "The contract [56 Form] vests ownership of
the oil and gas produced from the wells in the parties in the same per-
centage that they own interests in the well." 2 Professor Kuntz has ana-
lyzed the effect of the ownership clause, noting that:
The ownership provision has the literal effect of making the owners
cotenants in the oil or gas produced. According to the strict rules of
conversion, an owner selling the entire stream for its own benefit
would be liable for conversion of the gas owned by other parties.53
Arguably the ownership clause gives each working interest owner an
undivided interest in each molecule of gas produced. Professor Kuntz
has indicated that this would give rise to a conversion claim whenever
less than all of the working interest owners were marketing their shares
of the gas stream. It is arguable, however, that the rights of these con-
tractual cotenants are similar to their common law counterparts. There-
fore, if W, X, and Y are unable, or unwilling, to currently market their
share of the gas stream, then Z, who has developed a market, should be
able to sell the full stream without risking conversion. Otherwise, Z
could not develop its 25% interest in the gas. So long as Z stands ready
to account for 75% of the gas stream it is marketing, the other parties
have no valid complaint. 4 The Oklahoma Supreme Court seems to have
adopted this approach in Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp.,55 but the
opinion did not indicate whether the parties had an operating agreement
or were common law cotenants. 6
1. Cross-Conveyance
In Gillring Oil Co. v. Hughes 7 the court held that the ownership
clause of the 56 Form operating agreement creates a cross-conveyance of
rights in property covered by the agreement.5 8 Therefore, each working
interest owner becomes a common law cotenant with the other working
interest owners. By signing the operating agreement, W is deemed to
51. 711 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1983).
52. Id. at 952.
53. Kuntz, supra note 23, at 13-17.
54. See Kuntz, supra note 23, at 13-17 to 13-18. Professor Kuntz suggests such a result can be
obtained by giving effect to the provision, found in all the operating agreement forms, authorizing
each party to take their gas in kind. Ia
55. 782 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989).
56. Ia at 1371. The court noted that "[u]nder Oklahoma law Appellants and the other work-
ing interest owners in the well are tenants in common." However, the court did not indicate the
source of their cotenant relationship. Id See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
57. 618 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.), reh'g denied, (1981).
58. Id at 876.
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have assigned X, Y, and Z each an undivided 25% interest in W's 25%
unit area working interest. Similarly, X, Y, and Z have each assigned to
Wan undivided 25% in their respective 25% unit area working interests.
Professor Smith has commented on the impact of a cross-conveyance, 9
stating:
If such an estate [tenancy in common] has been created, no single co-
owner has the right to appropriate all of the production for himself.
Even though a mining cotenant informs the other cotenants that he is
extracting only his own share of the minerals, he is treated as a matter
of law as operating the mine or the oil and gas well on behalf of all
cotenants. The production is owned proportionately by all of the co-
tenants, who have a right to insist upon their proportionate share of
net profits.6"
The parties to the operating agreement, through the ownership
clause, effectively become common law cotenants. Professor Smith has
also suggested that the impact of the cotenancy theory may extend be-
yond mere accounting rights:
It also requires non-operator participation in take-or-pay settlements
and automatically assures non-marketing co-owners a right to share
proportionately in any payments made thereunder. Future contracts
cannot exclude their interests unless they elect to be excluded. 61
It is arguable whether these results must necessarily flow from a
common law cotenancy. Although the cotenancy may, by the contract,
extend to the molecules of gas produced, this does not require a depar-
ture from the traditional rules governing cotenants in the underlying in-
terest in land from which the production emanates. Courts could still
permit a marketing cotenant to enter into their own gas contracts and
take, for their own account, more than their proportionate share of the
gas stream. However, the marketing cotenant must be prepared to both
account to and permit the other cotenants to take or market their respec-
tive shares of the gas stream. The Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted
this approach in Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp.62 by holding that
Dyco, owning 47% of the gas stream, could market more than their 47%
share and sell the gas for their own account to selected gas purchasers.63
59. Smith, Gas Marketing by Co-Owners: Problems of Disproportionate Sales, Gas Balancing and
Accounting to Royalty Owners, RocKY MTN. Mni. L. FoUND. 12-1 (1988) (paper twelve (12) of the
Natural Gas Marketing II symposium) [hereinafter Smith].
60. Ia at 12-15.
61. Idr
62. 782 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989).
63. Id at 1371.
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The court characterized Dyco and the non-marketing working interest
owners as "tenants in common."" The remedy for the non-marketing
cotenants is to seek an accounting or pursue common law gas balancing
rights, such as balancing in kind and periodic cash balancing.6"
2. Cross-Conveyance and the 77, 82, and 89 Forms
Under the 77, 82, and 89 Forms of operating agreement there is
express language disclaiming a cross-conveyance (denoted in the forms as
"cross-assignment") between the parties to the agreement. However, if
the parties were common law cotenants coming into the operating agree-
ment, such as W and X, and Y and Z, the agreement might not affect
their common law relationships. The 89 Form addresses this issue by
providing that:
[I]n the event two or more parties contribute to this agreement jointly
owned Leases, the parties' undivided interests in said Leaseholds shall
be deemed separate leasehold interests for the purposes of this
agreement.66
The apparent intent of this provision is to ensure that all the parties are
on an equal footing under the operating agreement. Therefore, if Z is
marketing all the gas from the contract area for its own account, the 89
Form would make the accounting and balancing rights of W and X iden-
tical to those of Y (who is a common law cotenant of Z). The provision
also seems to eliminate a common law cotenant's right to seek partition.
This supplements the existing provisions in the form agreements which
expressly restrict a cotenant's right to partition.67
C. The Statutory Cotenancy
Statutes can create a cotenant-like relationship between working in-
terest owners. The most likely source of such a statute would be a state's
pooling laws. There may also exist special purpose statutes designed to
address specific problems associated with gas production. Such statutes
64. 1aL
65. Id. at 1373.
66. 89 Form, supra note 13, Art- III, § B, at 2 (emphasis supplied).
67. For example, the 77 Form provides that:
If permitted by the laws of the state or states in which the property covered hereby is
located, each party hereto owning an undivided interest in the Contract Area waives any
and all rights it may have to partition and have set aside to it in severalty its undivided
interest therein.
77 Form, supra note 13, Art. VIII, § F, at 12. Identical provisions are found in the 82 and 89
Forms. 82 Form, supra note 13, Art. VIII, § E, at 12; 89 Form, supra note 13, Art. VIII, § E, at 15.
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can create new rights; they can also define and modify existing common
law and contractual cotenancy rights.
1. Pooling Statutes: Louisiana
In Amoco Production Co. v. Thompson6 the court noted that under
Louisiana law, owners in "indivision" (the civil law analogue of a com-
mon law cotenancy) cannot develop the property held in indivision un-
less all cotenants consent. 69 The court found that "gas produced from a
compulsory unit initially is owned in indivision;" therefore, it was proper
to apply the "molecular" theory of ownership to the produced gas.7"
Under the Louisiana forced pooling statutes separate tracts within the
pooled area are converted into "a common interest with regard to the
development of the unit and the drilling of the well."71 Therefore, the
molecular theory of ownership in indivision applies to gas produced from
a force-pooled unit.
The Thompson court had to determine the validity of an order is-
sued by Professor Patrick Martin, then Commissioner Martin, which in
effect partitioned ownership in gas produced from a force pooled unit.
The order permitted each interest owner to market their gas in kind and
to sell, for their own account, the entire production stream when other
owners failed to take or market their proportionate shares of gas.72 The
court affirmed the position taken by Commissioner Martin, holding that
the Commissioner of Conservation has the statutory authority to effect a
partition by authorizing interest owners to take their share of gas in
68. 516 So.2d 376 (La. App. 1987), writ denied, 520 So.2d 118 (La. 1988), appeal after remand,
566 So.2d 138 (1990).
69. Id at 386. Contrary to the Louisiana rule, in Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and most other
producing states, any cotenant can mine minerals from land held in cotenancy without the consent of
the other cotenants. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
70. Thompson, 516 So.2d at 387.
71. Id at 383.
72. Id. at 389-90. Commissioner Martin's solution to the cotenancy problem is indicated by the
following portion of his order:
Any owner who wishes to market his share of production from a unit well may do so with
balancing to be done on a volumetric basis if he presently cannot, or does not choose to,
sell his gas. Any such owner can make his own sale at his own price or make up the gas in
kind later. If the owner does not elect to market his own gas, then he should not feel
harmed if the unit operator is authorized to market separately the gas attributable to that
non-operator's interest with accounting to be made on the basis of that separate sale. The
non-selling owner does not have a right to share in the selling owner's contract, though he
does have a right to an accounting in cash or kind for his share of the unit production.
Id at 390. The court, commenting on Commissioner Martin's order, stated that: "The practical
effect of this order was to allow the marketing owners to take their shares in kind (sole ownership),
both prospectively and retroactively. This had the legal effect of converting ownership in indivision
into sole ownership and effected a partition." Id
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kind.7 3 Regarding balancing problems when one interest owner takes
more than their share of the gas stream, the court stated that:
It is implicit in the obligation of the Commissioner to issue orders af-
fording each owner the right to recover his just and equitable share,
that the Commissioner can order an accounting in kind for balancing
purposes or an accounting in cash (if such is the only available practi-
cal relief).74
2. Special Purpose Statutes: Oklahoma
Title 52, sections 541-547 of the Oklahoma Statutes,75 commonly
known as "House Bill 1221" and also as the "Sweetheart Gas Act," took
effect May 3, 1983 and applies to the distribution of production proceeds
received on or after that date.76 The Act was intended to ensure every
owner in a well has the opportunity to currently market their proportion-
ate share of gas whenever gas is marketed from the well. As the
Oklahoma Supreme Court observed in Seal v. Corporation Commission:77
In our opinion unless all owners in a well have equal opportunity to
sell gas from the well, they are not afforded the opportunity to produce
their just and equitable share of the gas. The purpose of the Act is to
afford this opportunity.78
This equal opportunity is provided through two procedures:
(1) When initial production is obtained, the operator is obligated to mar-
ket each owner's ratable share of production from the well; this is accom-
plished through a notice and election procedure specified in section 542B
of the Act.79 (2) After production from the well begins, any owner ob-
taining a contract to sell gas from the well must give written notice of the
contract terms to all owners in the well who do not have a contract.80
Each party without a contract then has the option to share in the pro-
ceeds from gas sales under any contract covering production from the
well. 81
73. IR at 392-93.
74. Id. at 394.
75. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 541-547 (Supp. 1990).
76. See Seal v. Corporation Comm'n, 725 P.2d 278, 294 (Okla. 1986), appeal dismissed sub
nom., Amerada Hess Corp. v. Corporation Cornm'n, 479 U.S. 1073 (1987).
77. a
78. Id. at 288; OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 541 (Supp. 1990) (each interest owner in well producing
gas afrorded "an equal opportunity to extract their fair share of gas ... .
79. Ox.aA. STAT. tit. 52, § 542B (Supp. 1990).
80. Id. § 543B.
81. Id § 543A.
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The operation of the Act contemplates that the operator and own-
ers, both with and without contracts, will follow the notice, offer, and
election procedures specified in the Act. Most of the current balancing
cases will require courts to determine each party's respective rights and
obligations when the procedural requirements of the Act have been ig-
nored.8" This becomes a difficult task when it is realized that the Act
preserves to each interest owner a high degree of discretion concerning
the marketing of their share of production.
The Act merely provides a marketing option for owners without a
gas contract; the owner can elect not to market their gas.8 3 The Act is
replete with statements regarding an owner's "opportunity" to market or
share in proceeds. Although any interest owner can effectively elect to
leave their gas in the ground, the Act provides for current marketing of
each owner's gas, unless they affirmatively indicate they do not want to
participate in current sales. Section 544 of the Act provides, in part:
"[t]he amount of gas produced daily, irrespective of the owner producing,
belongs to, is owned by, and shall inure to the benefit of each owner in the
well in proportion to each owner's interest in the well."8 4 This essentially
creates a statutory cotenancy in gas produced from a particular well, sup-
porting each interest owner's right to share in production proceeds. In
Energy Search Petroleum, Inc. v. Amoco Production Co.,85 the court cited
section 544 for the proposition that:
As tenants in common on the subject leases, the parties own a pro-rata
share of each 'molecule' of gas that comes out of a well. 52 O.S.
§ 544. Failure to pay for gas taken by an operator from a well where
the operator is a tenant in common amounts to conversion on the part
of the operator.86
It is arguable whether merely producing gas subject to section 544
could result in conversion. It is the statutory cotenant's failure to ac-
count to the other statutory cotenants that gives rise to a cause of action;
82. After studying Oklahoma oil and gas law for the past decade, I have determined why every-
one refers to certain statutes by their legislative bill designation: they desire to treat statutes such as
"House Bill 1221" and "Senate Bill 160" as though they were never enacted. wishful thinking, but
not much of a defense when someone decides to enforce the strictures of the statute.
83. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 542C-542D (Supp. 1990); Seal v. Corporation Comm'n, 725
P.2d 278, 288 (Okla. 1986), (court upholds Commission Rule 6-100 which recognizes express con-
tractual limitations on a party's right to share in production revenues created by operating, gas
balancing, or other agreements), appeal dismissed sub nor., Amerada Hess Corp. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 479 U.S. 1073 (1987).
84. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 544 (Supp. 1990) (emphasis supplied).
85. No. 87-C-375-E (N.D. Okla. April 20, 1989) (order granting summary judgment).
86. Id at 1.
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not the act of production. 7 Section 544 creates the statutory cotenancy
to provide parties with the opportunity to currently market their gas.
Therefore, if the non-marketing party fails to either timely assert the
right to share in proceeds,88 or to take their proportionate share of the
gas, a court should rely upon equitable balancing remedies instead of
treble damages 9 and conversion.
In Energy Search, the court held that production by a party under a
contract, occurring when there was no "split connection" on the well,
constitutes a conversion and a violation of section 544, which entitles the
non-marketing party to treble damages under section 547.90 In Energy
Search, as with Amoco Production Co. v. Thompson,91 the court failed to
recognize that multiple parties can market gas from a well without a split
connection.9" For example, X could be marketing half of the gas stream
87. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 544 (Supp. 1990) provides, in part:
Each owner who produces natural gas ... and who separately sells or otherwise disposes of
the gas must account to each other owner in the well not selling... for that owner's part of
the gas so disposed of or sold. In addition, each selling or disposing owner must compen-
sate each owner not selling... for that owner's proportionate part of the gas disposed of or
sold.
Id (emphasis supplied). The obligations to "account" and "compensate", measured by common law
cotenancy standards, may be satisfied by a subsequent balancing. The critical issue becomes timing,
i.e., whether the accounting must take place on the basis of a specific time period such as daily,
monthly, or yearly. See infra text accompanying notes 142-144.
88. The statutes require that the operator and parties with a contract initially notify other own-
ers in the well of the opportunity to market their gas or share in production proceeds. See OKLA.
STAT. tit. 52, § 543B (Supp. 1990). However, failing to adhere to such a notice requirement should
not automatically impose liability on the contracted party, particularly when the non-contracted
party fails to timely assert their rights under the statutes.
89. Id § 547 provides in part:
The Corporation Commission is herein empowered to promulgate rules and regulations...
including the power to establish and enforce penalties for violations thereof.... Such
power shall not preclude the remedies available through the district courts as provided by
existing law nor preclude the right, herewith granted, of any owner who is injured in busi-
ness or property by any other owner in the well by reason of any action in violation of the
provisions of this act to sue in the courts of this state and to recover threefold the damages so
sustained, the costs of the suit, and reasonable attorneyj'Js fees to be fixed by the court.
Id (emphasis supplied).
90. Energy Search Petroleum, Inc. v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 87-C-375-E at 4-5 (N.D. Okla.
April 20, 1989) (order granting summary judgment).
91. 516 So.2d 376 (La. App. 1987), writ denied, 520 So.2d 118 (La. 1988), appeal after remand,
566 So.2d 138 (1990).
92. The Energy Search court stated: "Without a split connection any theory ofover-production
is not applicable." and "Where, as here, the split connection has been removed, there is no other way
for Energy to sell its gas. Thus, the operator (Amoco) must account and pay for all gas disposed of
at the rate they were compensated." Id at 3,4. The Thompson court stated:
It is obvious that, if individual owners are allowed to take (partition) the gas in kind, some
form of balancing is required. Two owners cannot take gas from one well at the same time,
unless the connection to the well is split streamed. Thus, a party who wishes to take his
gas in kind must be allowed, absent split streaming, to appropriate 100% of the unit gas
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at the wellhead to Natural Gas Pipeline Company and Y could be mar-
keting, simultaneously, the other half of the gas stream to a factory in
Illinois using Natural's transportation services. The lack of a "split con-
nection" seemed to influence the Energy Search court in finding Amoco
liable for treble damages under the Act.93 Treble damages should be
awarded when the Act has been violated, but only then if the non-mar-
keting party can demonstrate they have been "injured" by the violation.
The Energy Search court's rationale was questionable. It is doubtful, af-
ter the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Dyco Petro-
leum Corp.,9 that sections 544 and 547 will be given such a restrictive
interpretation.
Although the Anderson9 court held that a cotenant can market gas
without the consent of other cotenants in the well,96 they expressly
avoided addressing the impact of section 544 on their holding.97 The
plaintiffs apparently decided, for tactical reasons, to abandon their claims
under sections 541-547.98 However, since the terms of section 544 are
self-executing, it seems the court should have addressed the statute in
defining basic cotenancy rights to gas produced in Oklahoma. After May
2, 1983, any gas produced from a well in Oklahoma "belongs to, is
owned by, and shall inure to the benefit of each owner in the well in
proportion to each owner's interest in the well."9 9 This is a rule of prop-
erty which must now be applied to any disproportionate gas sale
situation.
However, this does not mean that the court must employ a conver-
sion analysis merely because the parties own a proportionate share of
each gas molecule being produced. The section 544 ownership provision
can be equated to the ownership clause of the operating agreement.' °°
Other language in section 544 acknowledges that one party may be pro-
ducing and marketing more than their share of the gas stream. The first
sentence provides, in part: "[A]n owner of a well producing natural or
casinghead gas may produce daily from the well that amount of gas
production for a certain period of time. Each owner taking in kind has the same right to
get his share of the production this way.
Id. at 393.
93. Energy Search, No. 87-C-375-E at 3, 4.
94. 782 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989).
95. Id
96. Id at 1371-72.
97. Id at 1379.
98. I.d at 1369, 1379.
99. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 544 (Supp. 1990).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 47-56; see infra text accompanying notes 115-121.
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which may be lawfully produced therefrom."' O' Production is not lim-
ited by ownership; it is limited only by what can be extracted under the
pertinent statutes and regulations. 10 2 The final two sentences of the sec-
tion, by imposing an obligation to account and compensate non-market-
ing parties, acknowledge that certain owners will be routinely producing
more than their proportionate share of the gas stream. Section 542D
expressly states: "Nothing in this act shall be construed to... prevent
any owner.., from taking their share of production in kind or separately
disposing of their share." 103
It appears that the Oklahoma Legislature intended to preserve the
ability of each party to market more than their share of the gas stream so
long as the marketing parties account for disproportionate sales and pro-
vide the non-marketing parties with an opportunity to participate in cur-
rent sales. If a party declines to participate in current sales, the
marketing party can sell the full gas stream without committing a tort or
violating the Act. The remedy of the non-marketing party is to seek an
accounting or participate in some form of gas balancing. This brings the
analysis full circle back to Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp. 1o Even if
the Anderson court had applied section 544 in evaluating the ownership
rights of the parties, the result should be the same, because the same
analysis should be used. In fact, section 544 should make the analysis
easier, since Oklahoma courts will always be dealing with a statutory
cotenancy.105 Although marketing parties can still be liable for violating
specific statutory requirements, the mere production of gas will not be a
conversion or a violation of the Act. Production of a disproportionate
share will give rise to an obligation to account and compensate. How-
ever, the approaches to accounting and compensation should be identical
to the approaches suggested by the court in Anderson for use among
what the court characterizes as "tenants in common." 106 Although a
non-marketing party's basic right to revenue sharing under the Act must
be recognized, the Anderson analysis should be used where all parties
101. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 544 (Supp. 1990) (emphasis supplied).
102. For example, Id. § 29, which provides in part:
Every... person ... is hereby prohibited from taking more than fifty percent (50%) of the
daily natural flow of any gas well or wells unless, for good cause shown under the exigen-
cies of the particular case, the Corporation Commission shall establish a different percent-
age under the prescribed rules and regulations therefor.
Id.
103. Id. § 542D.
104. 782 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989).
105. However, the statutory cotenancy may be modified by contract.
106. Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 782 P.2d 1367, 1373 (Okla. 1989).
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have let the well flow without implementing or asserting rights under the
Act. This would prevent interest owners from using the Act for strategic
"hindsight" gas marketing.
III. THE RIGHT TO TAYE IN KiND
Although tax considerations are at the origin of the right to take in
kind, 1° 7 it is doubtful the right would be jettisoned if the tax motivation
was removed. With the availability of new gas marketing opportunities,
it is doubtful that lessees with a competitive edge will be willing to turn
over marketing activities to a well operator. Nor will such lessees be
willing to share their marketing prowess with others. If anything, the
desire to seek out and exploit new markets on an individual basis will be
a growing trend as the gas marketing infrastructure develops. Even if the
lessee does not feel creative, their lessor and the implied covenant to mar-
ket will require their active participation and, perhaps, experimentation.
Gas marketing is the area where the entrepreneurial spirit will flourish in
the years to come. The right to take gas in kind plays a major role in any
viable marketing scenario.
A. Right to Take in Kind Absent an Operating Agreement
As noted in Section II of this Article, the right to take in kind, ab-
sent specific authorization in an operating agreement, depends upon a
state's approach to the law of cotenancy. 108 Even in states such as Loui-
siana, where cotenancy rules prohibit taking in kind, forced pooling or
some other regulatory or statutory right may permit the parties to take in
kind." 9 Most courts acknowledge that the efficient development of min-
eral resources will be impaired if a right to take in kind is not
recognized. 110
B. Right to Take in Kind Under the Operating Agreement
All of the model form operating agreements authorize each working
interest owner to take their share of oil and gas production in kind. The
relevant portion of the clause in each form agreement provides:
107. See, e-g., I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126; I.T. 3948, 1949-1 C.B. 161.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 16-25.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
110. See, e-g., Fry v. Dewees, 151 Kan. 488, 99 P.2d 844 (1940).
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Each party shall take in kind or separately dispose of its proportionate
share of all oil and gas produced from the Unit Area ... Any extra
expenditure incurred in the taking in kind or separate disposition by
any party of its proportionate share of the production shall be borne by
such party.111
77 FORM
Each party shall have the right to take in kind or separately dispose of
its proportionate share of all oil and gas produced from the Contract
Area... Any extra expenditure incurred in the taking in kind or
separate disposition by any party of its proportionate share of the pro-
duction shall be borne by such party. Any party taking its share of
production in kind shall be required to pay for only its proportionate
share of such part of Operator's surface facilities which it uses.
112
82 FORM
Each party shall take in kind or separately dispose of its proportionate
share of all oil and gas produced from the Contract Area ... Any
extra expenditure incurred in the taking in kind or separate disposition
by any party of its proportionate share of the production shall be borne
by such party. Any party taking its share of production in kind shall
be required to pay for only its proportionate share of such part of Op-
erator's surface facilities which it uses.
113
89 FORM
Each party shall take in kind or separately dispose of its proportionate
share of all Oil and Gas produced from the Contract Area... Any
extra expenditure incurred in the taking in kind or separate disposition
by any party of its proportionate share of the production shall be borne
by such party. Any party taking its share of production in kind shall
be required to pay for only its proportionate share of such part of Op-
erator's surface facilities which it uses.
1 14
111. 56 Form, supra note 13, § 13, at 6 (emphasis supplied).
112. 77 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § C, at 6-7 (emphasis supplied). Note that the 77 Form
states each party shall have the "right" to take in kind. The 56, 82, and 89 Forms all state each
party "shall" take in kind.
113. 82 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § C, at 7-8 (emphasis supplied) (the language is the same
whether or not there is a gas balancing agreement).
114. 89 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § G, at II (emphasis supplied) (the language is the same
whether or not there is a gas balancing agreement).
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1. Taking in Kind and the Ownership Clause
As noted in Section II of this Article, the ownership clause creates a
contractual cotenancy in all production from the unit or contract area." 5
However, the ownership clause must be read in conjunction with each
party's right to take their share of production in kind. A logical reading
of these clauses should permit each party, as a contractual cotenant, to
market their share of production plus any other production that is not
being marketed by a cotenant. The producing cotenant would be obli-
gated to account to the non-marketing cotenants and be ready to surren-
der their share of the gas stream when they decide to commence
marketing. Professor Smith has adopted a similar view, noting that:
[E]ven when the-parties are actually tenants in common, there appears
to be no reason why they cannot contractually modify their common
law rights and obligations; and they would seem to have done so by
the language of Article VI.B. It expressly authorizes each party to
take his share in kind and separately dispose of that share. If this lan-
guage means anything at all, it must mean that each party has a con-
tractual right to partition out his share of production in kind without
any concurrent obligation to account to the other parties for part of
the sales price. 1 16
Professor Kuntz has acknowledged the importance of the right to
take in kind, but noted the "ingenuity of counsel" in the contract inter-
pretation process could result in varying interpretations." 7 He suggested
how a court might give both clauses effect. First, each party could mar-
ket their proportionate share of gas under the take-in-kind clause. Sec-
ond, the ownership clause would require each party to account to all
other cotenants for a proportionate share of the sales proceeds."' This
would achieve a result similar to that mandated by sections 541-547 of
the Oklahoma Statutes." 9 Considering the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
opinion in Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp.,120 it seems likely that
Oklahoma courts will give the take-in-kind clause priority over the own-
ership clause.
Professor Martin has taken the view that the ownership clause
merely states: "the overall quantum of production to which an owner is
entitled and is not an expression of the character of ownership of each
115. See supra text accompanying notes 45-56.
116. Smith, supra note 59, at 12-16.
117. Kuntz, supra note 23, at 13-18.
118. Kuntz, supra note 23, at 13-18.
119. Okla. Stat. tit. 52, §§ 541-544 (Supp. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes 75-103.
120. 782 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989).
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molecule produced, i.e. a tenancy in common." 12' Under Professor Mar-
tin's approach the take-in-kind provision would govern and the owner-
ship clause would serve merely as a statement of the parties' respective
shares in the contract area covered by the operating agreement.
2. Facilities and Notices
Each operating agreement form requires the interest owner to pay
for any additional costs needed to separately market their share of gas.'22
This would include such items as additional metering equipment and
connections. In the 77, 82, and 89 Forms the interest owner who takes in
kind need not pay for any part of the operator's surface facilities when
used solely to market gas belonging to the other interest owners.'23 If
part of the operator's facilities are used by the interest owner, they need
only pay for the proportionate share of the facilities which they actually
use.'24 With the advent of open access transportation, taking in kind will
often be merely a matter of communication as opposed to the construc-
tion of separate facilities.
Prior to the 89 Form, there were no stated notice provisions con-
cerning when a party could either commence or terminate taking in kind.
The 89 Form requires the interest owner to give the operator written
notice at least ten days before taking in kind commences.' 25 The 89
Form also requires that:
All parties shall give timely written notice to Operator of their Gas
marketing arrangements for the following month, excluding price, and
shall notify Operator immediately in the event of a change in such
arrangements. Operator shall maintain records of all marketing ar-
rangements, and of volumes actually sold or transported, which
121. Martin, supra note 6, at 13. In explaining his interpretive approach, Professor Martin
stated:
[S]everal courts have recognized that balancing in kind is an industry custom; a reading of
the joint operating agreement that the ownership paragraph relates to overall quantum
produced from the Contract Area and not to the character of that ownership nor to a duty
of any seller to account to all owners for sales is in accord with the custom and reflects that
understanding of the function of the take-in-kind provision of the joint operating agree-
ment. This reading harmonizes the different provisions of the joint operating agreement,
and one need not resort to the law of cotenancy for further guidance or for confusion. That
is to say, the 'ownership' clause of the joint operating agreement provides the quantum
each party is entitled to take when there is production but, in light of the right of each to
take in kind, it does not provide the nature of the ownership of each molecule.
Id. at 13-14.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 111-114.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 112-114.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 112-114.
125. 89 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § G, at 11.
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records shall be made available to Non-Operators upon reasonable
request. 126
IV. OPERATOR'S RIGHTS WHEN A PARTY DoEs
NOT TAKE IN KIND
Up to this point the focus has been on matters which define an oper-
ator's ability to take the gas and market it as their own. This section
addresses the other alternatives given the operator under the commonly
used forms of operating agreement.
A. Operator's Options for Dealing with Non-Operator Gas
One option for the operator is to simply market all the gas produced
from the well for its own account until the other non-operators com-
mence taking their respective shares. The operator's right to take un-
marketed gas in kind is the option addressed in previous sections of this
Article. Each operating agreement form also gives the operator a limited
option to either purchase a non-operator's gas, or act as the non-opera-
tor's marketing agent and sell the gas, for the non-operator's account, to
a purchaser. The relevant portion of the clause in each form agreement
provides:
56 FORM
In the event any party shall fail to make the arrangements necessary to
take in kind or separately dispose of its proportionate share of the oil
and gas produced from the Unit Area, Operator shall have the right,
subject to revocation at will by the party owning it, but not the obliga-
tion, to purchase such oil and gas or sell it to others for the time being,
at not less than the market price prevailing in the area, which shall in
no event be less than the price Operator receives for its portion of the
oil and gas produced from the Unit Area. Any such purchase or sale
by Operator shall be subject always to the right of the owner of the
production to exercise at any time its right to take in kind, or sepa-
rately dispose of, its share of all oil and gas not previously delivered to
a purchaser. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Operator shall not make
a sale into interstate commerce of any other party's share of gas pro-
duction without first giving such other party sixty (60) days notice of
such intended sale. 127
126. 89 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § G, at 11.
127. 56 Form, supra note 13, § 13, at 7.
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77 FORM
In the event any party shall fail to make the arrangements necessary to
take in kind or separately dispose of its proportionate share of the oil
and gas produced from the Contract Area, Operator shall have the
right, subject to the revocation at will by the party owning it, but not
the obligation, to purchase such oil and gas or sell it to others at any
time and from time to time, for the account of the non-taking party at
the best price obtainable in the area for such production. Any such
purchase or sale by Operator shall be subject always to the right of the
owner of the production to exercise at any time its right to take in
kind, or separately dispose of, its share of all oil and gas not previously
delivered to a purchaser. Any purchase or sale by Operator of any
other party's share of oil and gas shall be only for such reasonable
periods of time as are consistent with the minimum needs of the indus-
try under the particular circumstances, but in no event for a period in
excess of one (1) year. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Operator shall
not make a sale, including one into interstate commerce, of any other
party's share of gas production without first giving such other party
thirty (30) days notice of such intended sale.
In the event one or more parties' separate disposition of its share
of the gas causes split-stream deliveries to separate pipelines and/or
deliveries which on a day-to-day basis for any reason are not exactly
equal to a party's respective proportionate share of total gas sales to be
allocated to it, the balancing or accounting between the respective ac-
counts of the parties shall be in accordance with any Gas Balancing
Agreement between the parties hereto, whether such Agreement is at-
tached as Exhibit "E", or is a separate Agreement.
128
82 FORM
In the event any party shall fail to make the arrangements necessary to
take in kind or separately dispose of its proportionate share of the oil
and gas produced from the Contract Area, Operator shall have the
right, subject to the revocation at will by the party owning it, but not
the obligation, to purchase such oil and gas or sell it to others at any
time and from time to time, for the account of the non-taking party at
the best price obtainable in the area for such production. Any such
purchase or sale by Operator shall be subject always to the right of the
owner of the production to exercise at any time its right to take in
kind, or separately dispose of, its share of all oil and gas not previously
delivered to a purchaser. Any purchase or sale by Operator of any
other party's share of oil and gas shall be only for such reasonable
128. 77 Form, supra note 13, Art.VI., § C, at 7.
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periods of time as are consistent with the minimum needs of the indus-
try under the particular circumstances, but in no event for a period in
excess of one (1) year. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Operator shall
not make a sale, including one into interstate commerce, of any other
party's share of gas production without first giving such other party
thirty (30) days notice of such intended sale. 129
89 FORM
If any party fails to make the arrangements necessary to take in kind
or separately dispose of its proportionate share of the Oil and/or Gas
produced from the Contract Area, Operator shall have the right, sub-
ject to the revocation at will by the party owning it, but not the obliga-
tion, to purchase such Oil and/or Gas or sell it to others at any time
and from time to time, for the account of the non-taking party. Any
such purchase or sale by Operator may be terminated by Operator upon
at least ten (10) days written notice to the owner of said production and
shall be subject always to the right of the owner of the production upon
at least ten (10) days written notice to Operator to exercise its right to
take in kind, or separately dispose of, its share of all Oil and/or Gas
not previously delivered to a purchaser; provided, however, that the
effective date of any such revocation may be deferred at Operator's elec-
tion for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days if Operator has commit-
ted such production to a purchase contract having a term extending
beyond such ten (10)-day period. Any purchase or sale by Operator of
any other party's share of Oil and/or Gas shall be only for such rea-
sonable periods of time as are consistent with the minimum needs of
the industry under the particular circumstances, but in no event for a
period in excess of one (1) year.... Any such sale by Operator shall
be in a manner commercially reasonable under the circumstances, but
Operator shall have no duty to share any existing market or transpor-
tation arrangement or to obtain a price or transportation fee equal to
that received under any existing market or transportation arrange-
ment. The sale or delivery by Operator of a non-taking party's share of
production under the terms of any existing contract of Operator shall
not give the non-taking party any interest in or make the non-taking
party a party to said contract. No purchase of Oil and Gas and no sale
of Gas shall be made by Operator without first giving the non-taking
party ten days written notice of such intended purchase or sale and the
price to be paid or the pricing basis to be used. Operator shall give
notice to all parties of the first sale of Gas from any well under this
Agreement.
All parties shall give timely written notice to Operator of their
Gas marketing arrangements for the following month, excluding price,
129. 82 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § C, at 8 alternate (language from subsection labelled
"Option 2: No gas balancing agreement").
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and shall notify Operator immediately in the event of a change in such
arrangements. Operator shall maintain records of all marketing ar-
rangements, and of volumes actually sold or transported, which
records shall be made available to Non-Operators upon reasonable
request.1 30
1. Purchase of Non-Operator Gas
Each form operating agreement gives the operator the option to
purchase any non-operator's share of production. However, the opera-
tor's purchase option is subject to the non-operator's right to take the gas
in kind at any time. The 89 Form, for the first time, places some modest
limits on the non-operator's immediate right to take in kind. The non-
operator must give the operator at least ten days written notice before
they commence taking in kind. However, if the operator has committed
the non-operator's gas to a sales contract extending beyond the ten day
notice period, the operator can defer the non-operator's right to take in
kind for up to ninety days.1 3' This 90-day provision apparently applies
both to operator purchases of the non-operator's gas, as well as to situa-
tions in which the operator is acting as the non-operator's marketing
agent.
Any purchase or sale by the operator of a non-operator's gas can be
"only for such reasonable periods of time as are consistent with the mini-
mum needs of the industry under the particular circumstances.' 3 2 In no
event can the operator purchase or sell the gas for a period longer than
one year. However, this would not prevent the parties from entering into
a separate gas sales contract to govern operator purchases or a separate
marketing agreement concerning sales on the non-operator's behalf.
Under the 56 Form the operator must purchase or sell a non-opera-
tor's gas at "not less than the market price prevailing in the area, which
shall in no event be less than the price which Operator receives for its
portion of the oil and gas."133 The 77 and 82 Forms require payment of
130. 89 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § G, at 11 (emphasis supplied) (language from subsection
labelled "Option 2: No gas balancing agreement).
131. 89 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § G, at 11 (language from subsection labelled "Option 2:
No gas balancing agreement).
132. 89 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § G, at 11 (language from subsection labelled "Option 2:
No gas balancing agreement). This same restriction is also found in the 77 and 82 forms.
133. 56 Form, supra note 13, § 13, at 7. This provision places the operator at a disadvantage. If
the operator markets the non-operator's gas under the operator's existing contract, to the extent that
the current market price exceeds the contract price, the operator must account at the market price.




Pierce: The Law of Disproportionate Gas Sales
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1990
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
the "best price obtainable in the area for such production."1 4 The 89
Form substantially changes the prior forms by requiring the operator to
act in a "manner commercially reasonable under the circumstances"
when entering into a "sale" of a non-operator's gas. The new provision
specifically relieves the operator from any obligation to "share any ex-
isting market or transportation arrangement or to obtain a price or trans-
portation fee equal to that received under any existing market or
transportation arrangement."' 135 This new provision also states that a
sale or delivery of non-operator gas under the operator's existing con-
tracts will not give the non-operator any interest in the operator's
contract. 136
It is not clear whether these provisions will be applied to an operator
purchase, as distinguished from a sale, of non-operator gas. Arguably,
"any such sale by Operator" would include a sale to the operator as well
as a sale to a third party purchaser. In any case, before the operator can
purchase or sell the non-operator's gas, the operator must give the non-
operator ten days written notice of the proposed transaction including
the price or pricing formula.
1 37
2. Marketing Non-Operator Gas
The operator's sale of non-operator gas is governed by the same pro-
cedural limitations as is the purchase of non-operator gas. The major
distinction is the substantive difference in the relationship between the
operator and non-operator. If the operator is marketing gas on behalf of
the non-operators, the operator functions as their marketing "agent." 1 38
This agency relationship can give rise to fiduciary obligations related to
the marketing function. Although the 89 Form has attempted to narrow
the scope of the operator's duties in such a relationship, residual fiduci-
ary obligations remain in areas not expressly defined or limited by the
operating agreement. These obligations could include claims to take-or-
pay benefits under operator contracts, especially under the 56, 77, and 82
forms. 139
After analyzing the operator's options under the 56, 77, and 82
134. 77 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § C, at 7; 82 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § C, at 8.
135. 89 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § G, at 11.
136. 89 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § G, at 11.
137. 89 Form, supra note 13, Art. VI, § G, at 11.
138. See generally Smith, supra note 59, at 12-5.
139. Smith, supra note 59, at 12-6 to 12-11.
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forms, Professor Smith has suggested that: "Purchase of the nonoper-
ators' gas is the alternative which provides the best legal safeguards for
the operator who sells the entire production of a gas well."'" Professor
Smith concluded his analysis by offering the following advice:
The financial benefit received by an operator who opts to sell gas solely
on his own behalf may be offset by the uncertainty of the rights of the
non-marketing non-operators. They may be subjected to costly litiga-
tion even if they ultimately prevail in a suit seeking to force an immedi-
ate accounting for gas sales. A purchase of the non-operators' gas,
especially if accomplished through a separate instrument and accom-
panied by full disclosure, should clearly establish the rights of the par-
ties and significantly reduce the likelihood of costly litigation. 141
Professor Smith's suggestion avoids the fiduciary trappings of a market-
ing agent and frees the parties from the uncertainty of future accounting
and gas balancing equities. It also provides a basis for current account-
ing to royalty owners.
B. "Accounting"for Disproportionate Sales
Assuming the parties have run the conversion gauntlet by establish-
ing their right to currently take, or not take, production from a well, they
will be ready to "account" for the imbalance. An issue to initially ad-
dress is timing. If a party is entitled to an accounting on a daily, weekly,
or monthly basis, the parties are essentially treated as though the market-
ing parties are selling for every interest owner. If the non-marketing
party dislike the price or terms being obtained by the marketing parties,
this approach would be unacceptable to the non-marketing party. 42 If
the non-marketing party is able to freely enter and exit the contracts of
the marketing parties, this approach would be unacceptable to the mar-
keting parties.143
However, if the marketing party has the right to market all of the
production stream, the proper timing of an accounting should be when
there is a change in the parties' relative marketing status. For example,
140. Smith, supra note 59, at 12-17.
141. Smith, supra note 59, at 12-17.
142. See, eg., Teel v. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, 767 P.2d 391 (Okla. 1985), as corrected,
(1986), reh'g granted and opinion amended, (1987), reh'g denied, (1989) (Teel, not satisfied with the
price and other contract terms offered by the operators' gas purchaser, did not want to market his
proportionate share of the gas stream at that time).
143. This is one of the major criticisms of the revenue sharing rights created by OKLA. STAT. tit.
52, §§ 541-547 (Supp. 1990). See Hoefting, Gas Balancing Problems in a Deregulated Market:
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X has been marketing all the gas from a well in which W, Y, and Z own
undivided interests. If W subsequently commences taking their gas in
kind, or otherwise marketing their share, this would be a logical time to
trigger a balancing between X and W. It may also be an appropriate time
to balance with Y and Z; particularly since W may commence selling a
proportionate share of the gas stream attributable to Y and Z. If the
parties are unable to agree, the initial trip to court over a balancing mat-
ter should resolve the timing issue, at least until the parties' positions
significantly change.
An equally difficult question is the basis for adjusting each party's
rights with regard to balancing. The issue is whether to follow a strict
common law accounting for a proportionate share of net profits or seek
to enforce industry custom as an adjunct to the operating agreement and
request balancing in kind, or cash. Each party will naturally follow the
approach that will net them the greatest recovery. The balancing juris- -
prudence to date can be summarized as follows: Courts will try to iden-
tify the problems and motivations of the parties, evaluate how their
action or inaction has impacted each party, and arrive at a remedy the
court thinks is fair under the circumstances. 144 Precedent is of little
value; the equities are adjusted on a case-by-case basis.
Perhaps the most significant development in this area is that courts
will recognize any-form of balancing as a remedy for what are essentially
cotenant accounting problems. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in An-
derson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp.,145 observed that:
The law has been settled for some time that a producing cotenant must
account to a non-producing cotenant for the market value of the pro-
duction less any reasonable and necessary expenses of developing, ex-
tracting and marketing. Further, certain practices of the industry have
been acknowledged by the courts to remedy situations like that appar-
ently existent here where only certain working interest owners have
sold production. These practices involve balancing in kind the produc-
tion from the well by allowing cotenants like Appellants the opportu-
nity to market gas from the well (i.e. taking a certain percentage of an
overproduced party's gas until any imbalance in the cotenant's takes
from the well are made up), by periodic cash balancing whereby under-
144. See generally Beren v. Harper Oil Company, 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App.), as corrected
on limited grant ofcerL, reh'g denied, (1975) ; United Petroleum Exploration v. Premier Resources,
511 F.Supp. 127 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., Civil Action No.
88-1405 (E.D. La. April 17, 1989) (minute entry granting dismissal), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.
1990).
145. 782 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989).
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produced cotenants receive cash from producing cotenants in propor-
tion to their respective interests and cash balancing upon any particu-
lar gas reservoir's depletion. Instead of bringing an action for
accounting or relying on one of the potential solutions set forth above,
Appellants sought instead to turn what should have been largely an
equitable proceeding into a tortious one not sanctioned by Oklahoma
law.'4
It was not necessary for the Anderson court to evaluate the proper
form of balancing or accounting; 47 they merely concluded that the
under-produced cotenants did not have any conversion claim against the
over-produced cotenants. An issue not yet addressed by the courts is
whether the cotenant can insist upon an accounting for net profits instead
of any balancing remedy created by industry custom. Although some
courts treat balancing as merely a partition action,14 the form operating
agreements prohibit partition of the underlying property interest. How-
ever, the right to take in kind would seem to override any challenge that
a division of production, as opposed to the underlying property interest
from which the production emanates, is restricted by the partition clause
of the operating agreements. If the balancing remedy is chosen, the par-
ties must be prepared to convince the court that one form of balancing
under the circumstances is more equitable than another form. Regard-
less of what several courts and commentators say, balancing in kind is
not the preferred method for resolving gas imbalances.' 49 The preferred
146. Id. at 1373.
147. Id at 1373 n.18. The court stated: "On the instant record we have no reason to and do not
express any view as to which method of balancing might be appropriate in this case." Id (citing
United and Beren).
148. Eg., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 516 So.2d 376 (La. Ct. App. 1987), writ denied, 520
So.2d 118 (La. 1988).
149. Although there are many cases which say balancing in kind is the preferred method, the
method chosen is governed by its fairness to the parties under the circumstances. See, eg., Beren v.
Harper Oil Company, 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App.) (court applies cash balancing), as corrected on
limited grant of cert, appeal after remand, (1975) ; United Petroleum Exploration v. Premier Re-
sources, 511 F.Supp. 127 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (court applies cash balancing, while recognizing that
balancing in kind is the preferred method but excepting where equity dictates); Pogo Producing Co.
v. Shell Offshore, Inc., Civil Action No. 88-1405, 12 (E.D. La. April 17, 1989) (minute entry grant-
ing dismissal), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th Cir. 1990) (although balancing in kind may be the
"preferred method," circumstances may exist which make balancing in kind "inequitable"). An
exception to this observation may be Louisiana where balancing in kind is viewed as an act of parti-
tion. See Thompson, 516 So.2d at 376).
Professor Martin would refine my observation that taking in kind is not the preferred method
for resolving gas imbalances:
I think it would be more accurate to state that the industry custom and practice has been
for working interest owners to balance in kind, and when the courts have been asked to
resolve differences over balancing, the courts have used a standard of fairness to determine
if the industry custom should be applied to a given set of circumstances.
Martin, supra note 6, at 17 n.59.
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method is whatever a court thinks is fair under the circumstances. 1 0 As
with any other difficult and fact-sensitive issue, a court's analysis and
conclusions will sometimes be questionable.
1 5 1
V. DISPORPORTIONATE SALES AND NON-WORKING
INTEREST OWNERS
The rights of non-working interest owners, such as lessors, nonpar-
ticipating royalty interest owners, and owners of nonoperating interests
under an oil and gas lease, will be determined by the agreements which
created their rights, and, in some cases, by statute. 52 Agreements to
which they are typically not a party, such as the operating and gas bal-
ancing agreements, cannot affect their rights.5 3 A marketing program
agreed to by the working interest owners is not binding upon the non-
working interest owners unless their consent is obtained. Likewise, a
marketing program that develops by default is not binding upon the non-
working interest owners. Therefore, the marketing regime for purposes
of paying non-working interest owners may be significantly different
from the marketing regime pursued, either through agreement or default,
by the working interest owners.
A. The Lessor's Marketing Regime
The marketing regime between the lessor and lessee is defined by the
oil and gas lease. In all cases the royalty clause plays a major role; in
many cases the pooling clause impacts the analysis. Although the spe-
cific terms of the lease will ultimately govern, consider the following
commonly encountered lease provisions:
150. The concept is often referred to as "equitable gas balancing." See, eg., Pogo Producing,
Civil Action No. 88-1405, at 8 (characterizing equitable gas balancing by three methods depending
on circumstances: (1) balancing in kind; (2) periodic cash balancing, and (3) cash balancing upon
reservoir depletion).
151. See generally Hoefling, supra note 143, at 72-78 (criticizing the United decision as not being
faithful to Beren).
152. See, e'g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (Supp. 1989). The parties' rights may also be affected
by a pooling order issued by an administrative agency. See generally Martin, supra note 6, at 26.
153. An exception to this rule would be interests carved out of the oil and gas lease after the
agreement at issue took effect. However, interests carved out of the mineral interest, whether before
or after the lessee enters into the operating or balancing agreements, will be subject only to the terms
of the oil and gas lease.
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3. The royalties to be paid by lessee are: (b) on gas, including casing-
head gas and all gaseous substances, produced from said land and sold
or used off the premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or other prod-
ucts therefrom, the market value at the mouth of the well of one-eighth
of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells the
royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale
154
POOLING CLAUSE
5. Lessee is hereby granted the right to pool... the leased premises
.... The entire acreage pooled into a gas unit shall be treated for all
purposes, except the payment of royalties on production from the
pooled unit, as if it were included in this lease. In lieu of the royalties
herein provided, lessor shall receive on production from the unit so
pooled only such portion of the royalty stipulated herein as the amount
of his acreage placed in the unit or his royalty interest therein on an
acreage basis bears to the total acreage so pooled in the particular unit
involved. 155
Assuming there has been no pooling, the royalty clause requires payment
of a royalty on production "sold or used." Although some commenta-
tors suggest the right to payment may be affected by the "market value"
or "proceeds" (amount realized) language,' 56 in most situations, it
should not matter. The principal inquiry should be whether there has
been production of gas. The market value/proceeds inquiry will only be
relevant for determining the basis for calculating royalty once the basic
right to payment is established.
Unless the well is shut in, gas is being marketed from the property,
and is being "sold or used." This would apparently trigger a right to a
current payment of royalty on any gas removed from the premises, re-
gardless of which working interest owner was doing the marketing. This
approach is supported by recent cases denying lessors the right to share
in take-or-pay payments under gas purchase contracts.15 7 For example,
consider the difficulty a lessee would have explaining to a royalty owner
154. Form 88 - (Producers) Kan., Okla. and Colo. 1962 Rev. Bw, 3 (emphasis supplied) (this
lease form is commonly encountered in Kansas and Oklahoma; it is distributed by the Kansas Blue
Print Company).
155. Id. at 5 (emphasis supplied).
156. See Martin, supra note 6, at 26.
157. See generally Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988);
Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 708 F.Supp. 783 (E.D. La. 1989).
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why they are not entitled to share in take-or-pay payments, while at the
same time denying them any right to currently receive a royalty on gas
produced by the other working interest owners. The royalty owner has
been told to read Diamond Shamrock Exploration Corp. v. Hodel15" in
response to their request to share in take-or-pay payments received by
their lessee. Upon reading this case, they learn that royalty is due only
when gas is produced and sold from the leased land. The royalty owner
then asks the lessee for royalty on gas that is being produced from either
the "leased land", or land pooled with the leased land. The lessee admits
that gas is being produced and sold from the leased land, but they assert
it is not the lessee's gas; the lessee's gas, and the royalty owner's gas, is
still in the ground. The lessee explains that the reason for this is their gas
purchaser had refused to take any gas because of a pricing and take-or-
pay dispute under the lessee's gas sales contract. According to the lessee,
those problems have now been solved, because the lessee has been paid
$10,000,000, none of which is subject to the royalty clause. The gas sales
contract was subsequently terminated, by mutual agreement - of the
lessee and gas purchaser. However, for two years, other parties have
marketed all the gas produced from the well, and the lessor has received
no royalty.1 59
The royalty owner is understandably not impressed by the lessee's
"my gas, your gas, their gas" explanation. Nor is the royalty owner im-
pressed by the operating agreement, and perhaps even the gas balancing
agreement, that the lessee produces for the royalty owner's inspection.
The royalty owner's response in each case is properly: "These are not
my agreements; I didn't sign them." The royalty owner may decide to
pursue alternative courses of action. First, they can treat the lessee's gas
as having been produced. In this situation, the royalty owner has an
argument that gas has been produced and sold, and by the terms of its oil
and gas lease the lessee owes them a royalty, regardless of any collateral
agreements the lessee may have with third parties.
An alternative course of action would be for the lessor to "agree"
with the lessee: "Yes, my gas is in the ground, and has been there, essen-
tially shut-in and without any production for over a year, andyou haven't
timely paid the required shut-in royalty." The lessee will respond by
referencing the habendum clause of the oil and gas lease and will note
158. 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
159. See generally Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 708 F.Supp. 783 (E.D. La. 1989); see also Pierce,
Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: Relationships, Contracts, Torts, and the Basics, 41
Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 1-1 (1990).
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that other parties have produced over 10 million cubic feet of gas each
day from the well. In some states, particularly New Mexico, this asser-
tion may not be a defense.'" Pooling statutes in some states, such as
Oklahoma,16' resolve the problem by requiring all parties marketing
from a force-pooled unit to account to each royalty owner. 6 This issue
remains largely undecided in the other producing states.1
6 3
If the leased land has been pooled pursuant to a pooling clause, the
lessor can often make out an even stronger case for receiving a royalty on
all production from the pooled unit. Most pooling clauses contain the
stock language that the lessor will be paid a royalty "on production from
the unit," reduced proportionately to account for their surface acreage
contribution to the unit.' 6  Royalty owners will generally have a compel-
ling argument for the current payment of royalty regardless of which
party is marketing gas. Their right to be paid royalty should not be af-
fected by any difficulty in calculating the basis for payment.
Determining the basis for paying royalty seems difficult at first
glance. For example, the problem arises as to how to calculate the
amount of royalty due when the party contractually bound to pay the
royalty has not marketed any gas. The issue becomes whether the non-
marketing party would pay royalty based upon the sales proceeds ob-
tained by one or more of the marketing parties; also, the problem of what
would happen if the non-marketing party made up the underproduction
at either a higher or lower sales price would have to be considered. Per-
haps the best way to deal with these issues is to calculate royalty based
upon the sales made by the marketing parties. If this price is not repre-
sentative of that which a prudent operator would obtain under its im-
plied marketing obligations, the lessor could challenge the lessee's failure
to actively market the gas. An alternative approach, if royalty is based
upon "market value," is to pay the lessor the current market value re-
gardless of what the marketing parties receive for their gas. Such an
approach could also be used if a marketing party is getting above-market
160. See Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245, 479 P.2d 294 (1970) (rejecting the argument that the
capability of production satisfied the habendum clause, the court held that the shut-in royalty clause
was a condition which had to be satisfied to save the lease from termination).
161. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (Supp. 1990).
162. See Shell Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 389 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1964) (known as the
"Blanchard" case; the court adopted the "weighted average" approach to the royalty payment
problem).
163. Compare TXO Prod. Corp. v. Prickette, 653 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (weighted
average approach) with Puckett v. First City Nat'l Bank of Midland, 702 S.W.2d 232 (rex. Ct. App.
1985), writ ref'd n.r.e. (1986) (adopting tract allocation approach).
164. See supra text accompanying note 155.
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prices, in which the non-marketing lessee is unable to share. Calculating
market value may be difficult, but not impossible; it should be an easier
task today with the advent of a spot market for gas.
Another difficult issue is whether an "advance" royalty paid to the
lessor by their non-marketing lessee can be credited against royalty
otherwise due on gas taken by the lessee to balance in kind. The lessee
will claim that they merely made advance payments of royalty on gas
which they would produce in the future; lessors may not see it that way.
Even if the lessor is given the benefit of any price differences between gas
produced by the marketing parties and gas subsequently taken in kind by
the lessee, a literal reading of the royalty clause would require payment
of royalty on all gas produced, regardless of its designation as make-up
gas. This would create a strong incentive for a cash balancing approach,
instead of any form of balancing in kind.
The marketing party also has royalty problems; the issue is whether
the marketing party should either pay royalty based upon the entire gas
stream they sell, or pay as though they are only marketing their propor-
tionate share of the gas stream. Once again the lease contract will deter-
mine the parties' rights. If the lessee is crediting all of the gas sales
proceeds to its account, it will be difficult to argue the gas has not been
"sold or used" by the lessee. The asymmetrical treatment of royalty
among marketing and non-marketing parties is the result of asymmetri-
cal contractual obligations created by the oil and gas lease, operating
agreement, and gas balancing agreement. Courts can either attempt to
equitably harmonize the agreements, or enforce them individually with-
out regard to the new realities of the marketing side of the gas industry.
In the past, courts have pursued different paths in this area. 165
B. The Marketing Regimes for other Non-Working Interest Owners
The analysis for other non-working interest owners, such as nonpar-
ticipating royalty interest owners and overriding royalty interest owners,
should be identical to that used in the lessor case. The document creat-
ing the interest will define the rights of the parties; this assumes that the
165. For example, when dealing with the market value royalty issue, Texas and Kansas have
enforced the royalty clause without regard for the marketing realities of the gas industry. In con-
trast, Oklahoma and Louisiana have adopted rules which took account of the long-term gas contract
as the primary means for marketing gas. Compare Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866
(Tex. 1968) and Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876
(1977) with Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981) and Henry v. Ballard &
Cordell Corp., 418 So.2d 1334 (La. 1982).
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base document has not been modified by subsequent agreements,166 stat-
utes, or regulatory action. As with the oil and gas lease,, it remains to be
seen whether the courts will try to reconcile the express terms of the
document creating the interest with the marketing realities confronting
the working interest owners. 167
VI. CONCLUSION
The principles which apply to the resolution of cotenancy disputes
have been evolving since 1285.168 However, it is still unclear how courts
will apply these principles to resolve gas balancing problems. Although
carefully classifying the property interest is an important part of any bal-
ancing analysis, it is equally important to ascertain how contracts be-
tween the parties and statutory considerations effect the underlying
relationship. Regardless of the technical origin of the working interest
owners' relationship, courts should recognize the practical realities of gas
marketing, and avoid applying conversion principles to police the rela-
tionship. Instead, courts should realize that disproportionate sales are a
necessary adjunct of gas marketing, and adopt an analysis that will per-
mit maximum production of wells at all times, regardless of the market-
ing problems of individual working interest owners. The interests of
non-marketing parties can be protected by applying cotenant accounting
concepts and gas balancing. The final analysis will usually be one ofjudi-
cial conscience: the equities will determine how disproportionate sales
problems are resolved between working interest owners. It remains to be
seen whether this judicial conscience will play a role when defining the
rights of lessors, nonparticipating royalty owners, and others merely hav-
ing a right to share in production.
166. Subsequent agreements might include division orders, pooling agreements, or an agreement
to be bound by the terms of an operating agreement or balancing agreement. The ability to use
division orders to patch up problems created by an oil and gas lease has been severely restricted in
many states by either legislative or judicial action. See Pierce, Resolving Division Order Disputes: A
Conceptual Approach, 35 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 16-1, 16-38 to 16-41 (1989).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
168. Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. I; Statutes at Large, 196. See also Kuntz, supra note
23, at 13-6 to 13-8.
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